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DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE REGULATION LAW
TRADE SECRETS: STATE PROTECTION
VERSUS FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
DONALD H. J. HERMANN*
ITH ITS opinion in ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott,' the Su-
preme Court of Illinois continues its protection of industrial
trade secrets and again raises the question of the extent to
which the state law of trade secrets is compatible with federal patent
and antitrust laws. Two basic issues are raised by this decision: the
first is whether state trade secret protection may be extended to arti-
facts or processes which do not qualify for, or which have not
been granted, the protection of the patent laws; and secondly,
whether persons entrusted with trade secrets can be subjected to
restrictions which may restrain trade and would otherwise constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws.2
I. THE ILG CASE AND ITS RATIONALE
ILG Industries, Inc. sought injunctive relief against a competitor
and a former employee to prevent the use of dimensional informa-
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University; A.B., Stanford University,
J.D., Columbia University.
1. 49 Ill. 2d 88, 273 N.E. 2d 393 (1971). The court found clear precedent
for its holding in ILG Industries, Inc. in the opinion in Schulenburg v. Signa-
trol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
2. See generally Comment, The Copying-Misappropriation Distinction: A False
Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COL. L.
REV. 1444 (1971) where the authors note the conflict between the maintenance
of a free market and invention protection: "The policy of promoting inven-
tion and authorship is fundamentally inconsistent with the policy favoring compe-
tition. In this circumstance a balance between the two is established by Congress
in that crucial part of the legislation in which patentability and copyrightability
standards are set forth. If an item meets the subject matter standards of pro-
tectability, it possesses qualities that Congress thought worth encouraging in spite
of the cost of undesirable market distortions effected by the incentive. A sig-
nificant advance in technology or an addition to the corpus of works that pro-
vide intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction is deemed sufficient to overcome the
policy favoring competition. Conversely an item failing to meet the statutory
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tion and specifications used in the manufacture of component parts
of industrial fans. While the component parts were not patented,
ILG claimed that Robert Scott, a former employee in one of the
company's divisions, prepared and took with him drawings of retain-
ing rings, blades, and other specifications used in the manufacture of
industrial fans. Scott solicited customers of ILG and offered to sup-
ply fans of acceptable specifications which he arranged to have
manufactured by his co-defendant, Metal Spinner's, Inc. Scott
presented evidence that the ILG fans could be measured, and that
with the use of common industrial engineering formulae, the correct
specifications for the manufacture of the fans could be determined.
Moreover, evidence was presented that such dimensions could be
calculated within a satisfactory range from information contained
in ILG's published catalogue. However, ILG employees testified
that the measurement and statistical calculation necessary to repro-
duce the fans would require a period of approximately eighteen
months.
The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the trial court's finding that
the specifications and measurements were trade secrets and thus,
proper subjects for legal protection. Heavy emphasis was placed on
the confidential nature of the employment involved. The breach
of this trust relationship provided impetus for the court's granting pro-
tection to the employer, the owner of the trade secrets. Although the
court had limited the injunctive relief to a period no longer than
that required to duplicate those component parts of the fans which
had been copied, it did not limit the injunction merely to those
component parts which involved the trade secrets in question, but
instead enjoined the production of the total fan. The Illinois Su-
preme Court, in affirming this broad injunction, held that the pro-
duction of the total fan should be prohibited in light of the extreme
difficulty in fashioning a decree limited to certain component parts.
Moreover, the court upheld the limitation of the injunction to the
period necessary for statistical analysis and measurements of mar-
keted ILG fans which would be required for satisfactory independ-
ent reproduction.
standards is deemed so insignificant a contribution to the advancement of civili-
zation that distorting the allocation of resources in order to insure its creation
is unjustified." Id. at 1452.
1972]
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The court reasoned that the measurements and specifications were
trade secrets since the information was not generally available; in-
deed, that to obtain this information would require considerable ef-
fort and time. A duty of confidentiality was found to exist as a
consequence of the employment relationship; this duty was judged
to have been breached by the revelation and use of secret information
learned while an employee. Protection of the secret information was
provided through the use of a limited injunction. The determination
to grant protection was a result of a balancing of interests: the in-
terest of the business in maintaining any competitive advantage ob-
tained as a consequence of possessing secret information and the in-
terest of employees to be freely mobile and to utilize all the training
and information at their disposal in the employment market.8 Al-
though striking the balance in favor of protection, the court took
into account the interest of the employee to the extent that it lim-
ited the prohibition on his use of secret information obtained in his
employment capacity to a period which it determined would have been
sufficient for the employee to have independently obtained the infor-
mation.
II. STATE TRADE SECRET LAW
The controlling definition of a trade secret in Illinois was formu-
lated in Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff:4
3. See Fidler and Adair, Practical Aspects of Trade Secret Conflicts, 13 S.
TEX. L.J. 103 (1971) where the authors suggest the involvement of three parties
-the former employer, the employee and the new employer: "An employer typi-
cally wants the right to prevent a specialized or highly informed employee from
seeking or accepting employment with a competitor-and a competitor wants the
right to hire a new employee with specialized capabilities or developed knowledge
free of liabilities. The employee in the middle wants the right to seek oppor-
tunities wherever they may occur. This over-simplification of the respective po-
sitions of this triangular relationship can be restated in many different forms,
all of which ultimately are resolved essentially by the balancing equities." Id. at
103.
4. 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921). While Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff
provided the occasion for setting out the requirements for trade secret protection
in Illinois, it should be pointed out that the court denied relief finding that Victor
had not proved that it had discovered the process nor that it was a secret proc-
ess. The restraint of employees from a breach of a confidential relationship and
the enforcement of restrictive employment covenants rests on the employer's proof
of possession and use of a trade secret. Basically, an antitrust test was used
as the basis for reversing the injunctive relief granted by the appellate court. In
doing so, the supreme court stated that: "The contract is one in restraint of trade
[Vol. XXII: 196
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A trade secret is a plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound known only to
its owner and to those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it .... 5
A mere mechanical advance in the use of a process is not a new process or dis-
covery. To be a new process there must be employed creative facilities in origi-
nating it amounting to a meritorious discovery or invention. 6
There are, then, two basic requirements for relief from trade secret
being divulged: (1) the existence of secret information, and (2) a
confidential relationship between the person possessing the secret in-
formation and the person who would divulge or appropriate the
trade secret.
In Cook-Master v. Nicro Steel Products,7 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District adopted the stringent interpretation of
the Restatement of the Law of Torts:
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public knowledge or
of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his se-
cret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets
cannot be his secret.8
The comments to the Restatement of Torts also provide some guide-
lines for the determination of the existence of a trade secret:
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's
trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved
in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy cf
the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired
or duplicated by others. 9
The Restatement acknowledges the fact that protection of trade
secrets is a departure from the maintenance of open market compe-
and void. It prohibits Iliff from directly or indirectly giving any person any in-
formation in regard to the whole or any part of the plant or processes of com-
plainant, and from doing anything which might injure, by competition or other-
wise, the complainant, its successors or assignees, in the business. The restraint is
unlimited as to time and place, and the proof does not show that complainant has
any trade secret whatever." Id. at 551, 132 N.E. at 813.
5. Id. at 545-46, 132 N.E. at 811.
6. Id. at 546-47, 132 N.E. at 812.
7. 339 Ill. App. 519, 533-34, 90 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1950).
8. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939). The American
Law Institute has made available Tentative Draft No. 8 of the Restatement of
Torts, Second (1962) which covers Trade Secrets. The Institute did not, however,
consider any revision of § 757.
9. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b at 6; cited with approval by the
court in ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396
(1972).
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tition: "The privilege to compete with others includes a privilege to
adopt their business methods, ideas or processes of manufacture."' 0
This departure from a policy of open competition is said to be justi-
fied, according to the court in ILG Industries, by the balancing
of conflicting social and economic policy considerations: the need
to protect the business investment which produced the trade secret
versus the right of an individual to follow and pursue a particular
occupation utilizing all his knowledge and experience." The court
strikes this balance by providing a limited protection for the secret
which would deprive the employee of any special benefit he has gained
as a consequence of his confidential relationship with the trade se-
cret owner.
The second requirement for trade secret protection is the existence
of a confidential relationship the breach of which is said to occasion
the disclosure or appropriation of the trade secret. As the com-
ments of the Restatement of Torts suggest, it is not that the posses-
sion of a trade secret is "a right of property," rather "the theory
that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a gen-
eral duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of
this duty: that is, breach of contract, abuse of confidence or
impropriety in method of ascertaining the secret;" the Restatement
conclusion is that "[alpart from breach of contract, abuse of con-
fidence or impropriety in the means of procurement, trade secrets
may be copied as freely as devices or processes which are not se-
cret."12
In Jones v. Ulrich, 3 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District, held that a breach of a confidential relationship provided a
basis for the exercise of state jurisdiction to protect trade secrets
10. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment a at 2. See also Restatement of
Torts § 708.
11. 49 111. 2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1972).
12. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment a at 4. See Comment, Theft of
Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 383
(1971) where it is observed that: "[T]he great majority of American legal scholars
and courts have whenever possible deemphasized the question of plaintiff's property
interests and the plaintiff's rights 'against the world' with respect to a trade se-
cret. Most of the cases have in fact involved employees and breach of confiden-
tial relationship, not theft. The courts have preferred to rely on the established
theories of quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and fiduciary relationships." [Notes
omitted.]
13. 342 111. App. 16, 95 N.E.2d 113 (1950).
[Vol. XXII: 196200
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even though the federal patent statute provides that there will be no
restriction on a purchaser or user of an invention or article prior to
any patent application.' 4 In Jones, the plaintiff sought injunctive
relief against a machine shop operator's use of innovations in a
spreading device which the plaintiff had brought into the machine
shop for welding. The court held that while the federal patent statute
did not extend its protection to situations where information or a
prototype was obtained as a result of a breach of confidence, that the
federal patent statute did not pre-empt the field of invention protec-
tion. 15 The court derives its jurisdiction by characterizing the action
as being one of breach of trust and maintains its jurisdiction through
its differentiation between the purpose and effects of patent law and
trade secret law.
It is well established that equity will enjoin the use and disclosure of trade secrets,
such as processes, formulae, and inventions learned in confidence. The difference
between secret processes and patents is that the owner of a patent has a monopoly
against all the world, while the owner of a secret process has no right "except
against those who have contracted, expressly or by implication, not to disclose the
secret, or who have obtained it by unfair means." The jurisdiction of equity to
protect such trade secrets is founded upon trust or confidence. The court "fastens
the obligation upon the conscience of the party, and enforces it against him in the
14. See Sec. 48, Title 35 U.S.C. RS. § 4899, which provides: "Every per-
son who purchases of the inventor, or discoverer, or with his knowledge and
consent constructs any newly invented or discovered machine, or other patentable
article, prior to the application by the inventor or discoveror for a patent, or so
sells or uses one so constructed, shall have the right to use, and vend to others
to be used, the specific thing so made or purchased, without liability there-
fore." See also Dable Train Shovel Co. v. Flint, 137 U.S. 41 (1890); Wade v.
Metcalf, 129 U.S. 202 (1889).
15. 342 Ill. App. 16, 24-25, 95 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1950). The court views the
patent law as providing the exclusive federal jurisdiction in suits for infringement,
but views the state court as retaining jurisdiction not only in cases involving non-
patentable trade secrets but also in cases where the validity of the patent arises as
a collateral issue. "The mere fact that a patent or an application for a patent is
involved in a case does not oust the jurisdiction of the State courts in favor of Fed-
eral courts. In a direct proceeding for the infringement of a patent the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts is exclusive, but where the question arises collaterally it
not only may be determined by the State courts, but in the absence of diversity
of citizenship must be so determined." Id. at 25, 95 N.E.2d at 117. But see
Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent
Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 673 (1971), where the author concludes: "There
are good reasons for making a federal court at least an available forum to either
party, and not just to the plaintiff, in all cases raising issues of federal patent law.
Federal judges possess greater expertise in handling patent matters. More import-
antly, with their secure tenure and national perspective, they possess a higher sensi-
tivity to the delicate balance between the policies of encouraging inventiveness on
the one hand and of fostering free economic competition on the other."
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same manner as it enforces against a party to whom a benefit is given, the ob-
ligations of performing a promise on the faith of which the benefit has been con-
ferred."16
The court in Jones required neither that there be a written or oral
contract to keep a disclosure secret nor that the information be ob-
tained by trick, artifice or fraud. Instead, the court inferred a con-
fidential relationship from the unilateral disclosure of the secret by
the plaintiff to the defendant whose business of machine welding
and repair was said to create a basis for trust. This agreement
to service the plaintiff's machine was found to create an obligation
of confidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of trade secret
protection. The court stated that "such an agreement in itself
implied a confidential relationship because, without such confidence,
such an agreement in practicality would be a nullity.' 17
In the same year that Jones was decided, an Illinois appellate
court considered a case involving similar facts, Cook-Master, Inc. v.
Nicro Steel Products,' where it was held that the necessary confiden-
tial relationship would not be inferred where specifications for a
product's manufacture were provided to a fabricator. In Cook-
Master, the defendant began manufacturing and selling products
identical in design and specifications with the sets of utensils that it
had promised to manufacture for the plaintiff. The court con-
cluded that the design and manufacture of the marketed utensils
did not constitute a trade secret since "matters which are com-
pletely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be his se-
cret.""9  Moreover, the court refused to imply a contractual promise
of confidentiality, finding that the facts were not "sufficient to em-
brace a confidential relationship, or matters of such secret nature as
would compel the defendants to treat it as confidential matter. Nor
16. 342 Ill. App. 16, 29, 95 N.E.2d 113, 119 (1950) [Citations omitted].
17. Id. at 26, 95 N.E.2d at 117. The difficulty with the courts implying the
term of confidentiality is that all such implication involves an element of judicial
creation of contract obligations. The parties expressly contracted here for welding
to be done for payment. The imposition of an obligation of confidentiality cer-
tainly reduces the likelihood of competing production. While secrecy and con-
fidentiality may be a requirement of the possessor of an innovative idea before he
will divulge it to anyone or use it in production, perhaps such a person should
expressly contract for this secrecy, especially if the free market and open competition
have the higher public policy priority.
18. 339 Ill. App. 519, 90 N.E.2d 657 (1950).
19. Id. at 533, 90 N.E.2d at 663.
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does the relationship of the parties partake of a fiduciary nature."2
The Cook-Master decision suggests that there is a direct relationship
between the nature of the secret and the likelihood of inferring an
obligation of confidentiality; the greater the secrecy or the difficulty
of duplication then the greater the likelihood of finding an obliga-
tion of confidentiality, and hence the greater the likelihood of protec-
tion. The court suggests that the need to stimulate invention and to
encourage its use results in a judicial disposition to protect what may
be a nonpatentable idea or process. Where such an idea or proc-
ess is shown and legal protection petitioned, the court seems dis-
posed to infer an obligation of confidentiality from contracts of em-
ployment and from licensing contracts. The difficulty with this
proposition is that it reveals a potential clash with patent law-since
patent law is the exclusive basis for limited protection of the products
of invention, an encroachment is made by the law of trade secret
protection when it rests fundamentally on the finding of an inven-
tion and not on the existence of a confidential relationship.2
Precedent for the ILG Industries case can be found in the 1965
case of Schulenburg v. Signatro22 which provided injunctive relief
against a former employee of a manufacturer of light flashers.
The employee was found to have used the manufacturer's blue-
prints, measurements, and specifications in order to produce devices
20. Id.
21. See Fidler and Adair, Practical Aspects of Trade Secret Conflicts, 13 S.
TEx. L.J. 103, 105 (1971) where the authors observe the inverse relationship be-
tween the "quality" of the trade secret and the nature of the breach of the inferred
confidential relationship. "The term 'trade secret' has come to mean the grav-
amen of a legal controversy between the employer and the employee which must
be present to support a legal action. By the same token, impropriety in conduct
on the part of the acquirier of the trade secret is almost always present where an
employer's right is enforced. With a certain amount of impreciseness, there would
appear to be an inverse relation between the quality of the trade secret and mis-
conduct. Gross misconduct almost inevitably will support a holding for the em-
ployer for a very minimal trade secret, while little misconduct is required for such
a holding when an extremely unique and valuable trade secret is at stake.
"It would seem that great amount of focus is often misplaced on the 'trade
secret' as being the principal concern of the action when the cause of action is
principally supported by unfair conduct. In most cases it would seem that tradi-
tional analysis based upon the quantitative and qualitative merit of the trade secret
can be far too pessimistic. When there is a highly guarded unobvious development,
the value of the trade secret can transcend relative conduct of the parties, but
more often than not, the value of the secret is principally to support a holding
based on unfair conduct." Id. at 105. [Emphasis added].
22. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 I1. 2d 397, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
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which he sold in competition with his former employer. As in ILG,
the injunctive relief was limited to a period of time reasonably re-
quired to legally produce copies. The significance of the ILG de-
cision, and its reaffirmation of the results and reasoning of Schulen-
burg, arises from the fact that a number of Illinois appellate court
decisions seemed to erode or limit Schulenburg23 and from the fact
that a number of federal decisions involving patent issues raise
the question whether Congress has restricted, if not pre-empted, the
field of trade secret protection by the enactment of the federal pat-
ent statute.24
Three cases decided in the First District of the Appellate Court of
Illinois in the period following Schulenburg suggest that the case
should be confined to its facts. In Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc.,25 the
court differentiated between two groups of employees who had be-
come engaged in the manufacture of products in competition with their
former employer. The court upheld an injunction against employ-
ees who had taken secret drawings and used them to produce compet-
ing goods. On the other hand, the court affirmed the denial of in-
junctive relief against an employee who solicited customers of his
former employer using lists which were openly available in the indus-
try. In so doing, the court reasoned:
Our free economy is based upon competition. One who works for another cannot
be compelled to erase from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge, acquaint-
ances and the over-all experience which he acquired during the course of his em-
ployment.26
In addition, the court suggested that the emphasis the court in Schu-
lenburg had placed on denying an employee any competitive ad-
vantage he had obtained against his former employer and over others
in the open market was misplaced. Rather, injunctive relief was
23. See Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc., 85 Ill. App. 2d 350, 228 N.E.2d 742 (1967);
Heathbath Corporation v. fkovits, 117 Ill. App. 2d 158, 254 N.E.2d 139 (1969);
and Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder, 120 Ill. App. 2d 170, 256 N.E.2d 357
(1970). These cases are discussed below.
24. See Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-emption-the Aftermath of Sears
and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SocY. 713, 733 (1967), where the author concludes:
"[O]n the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, it would appear that the fed-
eral patent laws fully occupy the field of inventions in commercial use in the
absence of a pending patent application covering such inventions."
25. 85 I11. App. 2d 350, 357, 228 N.E.2d 742, 746 (1967).
26. Id. at 357, 228 N.E.2d 742, 746 [Emphasis added].
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granted fundamentally on the basis of breach of contract, fraud,
or theft.
If a salesman has agreed to a restrictive covenant in his employment contract, or
if he has fraudulently and surreptitiously copied or removed lists of customers [or
drawings and specifications] from a prior employer, or if the names of actual or po-
tential customers are confidential, not subject to memory, are not publicly listed,
or otherwise readily obtainable, then, under proper circumstances, such salesman
might be enjoined from soliciting business from the customers of his prior employer.
Absent such circumstances, however, there can be no such prohibition.2 7 [Emphasis
added.]
The gravamen of the action according to the Revcor decision, then,
is one of breach of contract or a tort action for fraud or conversion.
In Heathbath Corporation v. Ifkovits, 28 the Illinois appellate court
again distinguished between enjoining an employee from the use of a
secret formula, learned in prior employment for a period of time
necessary for independent production of the formula and enjoining
the use of customer lists obtained as a consequence of the former
employment, but which were otherwise publically available. The
former prohibition was found to be enforceable with specific reference
to the facts of the case, while the latter injunction was not granted. A
critical fact, cited by the court, was the defendant-employee's admis-
sion "that he had signed a contract with MFR [the parent company
of the plaintiff] in 1960 agreeing to maintain secrecy in connection
with methods, processes and systems employed. ' 29  The court con-
cluded that the evidence supported the contention that the secret form-
ula was learned in an employment capacity that involved a fidu-
ciary relationship. The finding of this fiduciary relationship was
fully supported by the terms of the employment contract. While
the court did not consider whether the contract was limited by the
antitrust laws, it did conclude that it was to be enforced to the ex-
tent that a limited injunction would afford traditional trade secret
protection: "[T]he proper scope of the injunction is the period re-
quired for the defendant to duplicate the formulas, which we have
held to be trade secrets, by lawful means. '30
In 1969, the appellate court was simultaneously faced with the
Illinois precedent in Schulenburg and with the federal case law devel-
27. Id.
28. 117 I11. App. 2d 158, 254 N.E.2d 139 (1969).
29. Id. at 162, 254 N.E.2d at 141.
30. Id. at 167, 254 N.E.2d at 144.
1972]
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opment restricting the power of states to offer relief in cases in-
volving the use or appropriation of unpatented trade data or man-
ufacturing specifications.3 1  In Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder
Co.,32 plaintiff sought to enjoin the production and sale of air cylin-
ders which were copies of its own product. Carlstead, a former
employee of Bimba, provided catalogues consisting of drawings and
printed specifications to individuals who had formed a manufactur-
ing company to compete with Bimba. Although the trial court en-
joined the defendants from manufacturing the competing air cylin-
ders for a period of twelve months, the appellate court reversed,
finding no trade secret which merited protection and no violation of
any fiduciary duty arising directly from Carlstead's employment ca-
pacity. The court held that since the plaintiff had marketed the
air cylinders and since the cylinders were not patented, the plaintiff
failed to produce subject matter which merited protection: "Plain-
tiff, without obtaining a patent on any of them, distributed its cylin-
ders in a way that anyone could cut one, disassemble it, and learn
how it could be manufactured. In sum, plaintiff had no trade se-
cret concerning its cylinders." 33
The principal basis for denying the existence of a trade secret,
was the court's reading of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel"4 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting. The appellate court observed that:
[in these two cases the Supreme Court held that because of federal patent laws,
a state may not, when an article is unpatented, prohibit the copying of the article
itself, or award damages for such copying, even if the copied article is so much a
duplicate that it produces confusion concerning the source of the article.3 6
31. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376
U.S. 973 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, rehearing
denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964); and Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
32. 119 I1. App. 2d 251, 256 N.E.2d 357 (1969).
33. Id. at 365, 256 N.E.2d at 364.
34. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). While both Stillel and the following case, Compco,
involve only the question of the enforcement of state unfair trade law by enjoining
the production of the copying product, the court's holding of pre-emption of state
unfair trade laws reveals some doubt as to the validity of state trade secret law by
the patent laws to the extent that the injunctive relief granted at the trial court level
was prohibited by the supremacy clause and to the extent that the language of the
court's opinions indicate that there is some problem with the co-existence of state
trade secret laws and federal patent laws.
35. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
36. 119 Ill. App. 2d 251, 269, 256 N.E.2d 357, 366 (1969).
206 [Vol. XXII: 196
TRADE REGULATION LAW
Further, the court concluded that the, prohibition on the copying of
unpatented manufactured items conflicted with the federal patent
law:
The injunction and award of damages predicated solely on defendant's copying of
plaintiffs unpatented cylinder conflict with federal patent laws. "[F]ederal law re-
quires, that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless
they are protected by a valid patent."137
The court in Bimba distinguished Schulenburg which was said to
permit recovery on the basis of (1) plaintiff's ownership of a trade
secret and (2) defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty by the
appropriation of plaintiff's blueprints, drawings and designs. The
Bimba court suggested, as has been shown, that the pre-emption of
an area of industrial innovation by the federal patent laws se-
verely restricted the instances where a trade secret could be found to
exist. As to the breach of duties of confidentiality, the court sug-
gested that such duties could be found as a consequence of an ex-
press contract or implied from a relationship of trust. However,
the court suggested that other remedies for a breach were available
and perhaps preferable to an equitable action based on trade secret
law given the recent United States Supreme Court opinions suggesting
federal pre-emption of the trade secret law.
In this [employment] relationship Carlstead owed plaintiff the obligation not to
divulge any information concerning plaintiffs business which was imparted to him.
Information which Carlstead could not disclose because of his fiduciary relation, in-
cluded customer lists which plaintiff may have compiled. Carlstead owed plaintiff
the duty not to compete with it, using information acquired by him in his relation
as its accountant and one of its directors. Violation of the duties Carlstead
owed plaintiff could in themselves be actionable; and if he committed any breach
of these in concert with others to injure plaintiff's business, the concert of action
would constitute a conspiracy.3 8 [Emphasis added.]
The Bimba court, then, suggests that other theories may provide
a basis for restraint against or recovery from an employee who vio-
lates a duty of trust arising from an express or implied term of the
employment contract. One alternative approach to remedy such
breaches may be the underlying contract theory recognized by the court
in the ILG case. Since the ILG opinion acknowledges the right to
copy and manufacture the items which it characterizes as trade se-
37. Id. at 370, 256 N.E.2d at 367, quoting with approval Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969).
38. 119 Ill. App. 2d 251, 266, 256 N.E.2d 357, 365 (1969) [Citations omitted].
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crets after a period necessary for independent reproduction has ex-
pired, the real issue centers on the advantage that a former em-
ployee has obtained as a direct consequence of his past employ-
ment. Accordingly, the trial court is best advised to determine (1)
whether in fact there was duty to the former employer or a confiden-
tial relationship which has been breached, and (2) what damages
have been suffered by the former employer. The trial court is then
able to fashion appropriate relief whether it be damages or injunc-
tive relief. Indeed, this approach may be required if, as a series of
Supreme Court opinions suggest, protection of industrial trade se-
crets has been pre-empted by the federal patent law.39
III. FEDERAL PATENT LAW
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
that Congress has the power to grant protection to inventors and
their discoveries in order to promote scientific development.4 Ex-
ercising this power, Congress enacted the Patent Act1 under which
an inventor can obtain an exclusive monopoly 42 over the subject
matter of the patent for a period of seventeen years.43 This grant
of protection is conditioned upon a showing of new, useful and non-
obvious processes, machines, and manufacture or composition of
matter. 44 Suit may be brought against anyone for damages or injunc-
39. These cases, discussed below, are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
and Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
40. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, provides: "The Congress shall have power
• . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective writings
and discoveries."
41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964) as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 41-282 (Supp. V,
1970) [hereinafter Patent Act].
42. See P. Areeda, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1967 ed.) where the author suggests
that one of the purposes of granting this "monopoly" is to create an "incentive"
for invention: "The patent guarantees the inventor a monopoly of his invention,
and the resulting prospect of monopoly profit stimulates both additional inventive
efforts and the investments required to put such inventions rapidly into use."
Id. at 320.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970), provides in part: "Every patent shall contain a
short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assignees, for the
term of seventeen years, subject to the payment of issue fees as provided for in
this title, of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the inven-
tion through the United States ....
44. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1964).
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tive relief where infringement of a validly issued and secured patent
can be shown.45 Recent federal court opinions have raised the
question of the extent to which this patent protection and suits for
patent infringement constitute the sole protection available for in-
dustrial secrets.4
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided the companion
cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 47 and Compco Corp. v.
45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (Supp. V,
1970). Treble damages and attorney fees may be obtained in certain cases.
46. It has been argued that while Congress could pre-empt the field of trade
secret law under its interstate commerce power and constitutional power to protect
inventors, it has not done so. The most significant evidence of this fact, it is said,
are the congressional enactments prior to and subsequent to the promulgation of
the Patent Act, which expressly recognize trade secrets. See, e.g., Milgrim, Sears
to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 33 at
n.67 (1971) where the author notes a series of statutes which prohibit dis-
closure of trade secrets by certain governmental agencies and which limit these
agencies in their ability to compel disclosure of trade secrets.
However, it may be necessary to distinguish industrial and commercial trade
secrets in order to define the area of possible pre-emption by the Patent Act and
to determine the intended coverage of the federal acts which provide for protection
of "trade secrets." Commercial trade secrets are unrelated to patentable subject
matter, (e.g., customer lists, supplier lists); industrial trade secrets are of the same
nature as the matter which is susceptible of patent protection (e.g., secret proc-
esses, machines, formulas, designs). The latter may be precluded from state pro-
tection; the former may be subject to state protection as well as proper subject
matter within the intent of Congress' grant of protection in the statutes which ex-
pressly purport to protect trade secrets. See, e.g., Adelman, Trade Secrets and
Federal Pre-emption-the Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
Socy. 713 (1967), where the author makes the above distinction: "[O]nly a
portion of all industrial secrets come within the definition of protectable subject
matter set forth in Sees. 101 and 171 of the 1952 Patent Code. Since Sec. 171
deals solely with ornamental designs, for purpose of convenience, designs will be
considered as if they were covered by Sec. 101 rather than Sec. 171.
"Sec. 101 defines subject matter of patent protection as follows:
'Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matters, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.'"
Thus, only secret processes, machines, formulas, new products and designs and
improvement thereof are inventions within the definition of Sec. 101, and, since a
secret invention may be the subject of a patent application, such secrets may be
termed Sec. 101 trade secrets. Of course, the eventual success or failure of such an
application would depend on whether the invention passed the hurdles imposed
by Sees. 102 and 103. Since Congress has not legislated in the field of non-section
101 industrial secrets and since their protection does not appear to frustrate the
purpose oj the patent laws, the protection of non-section 101 secrets would not
appeaer to be preempted by federal patent policy." Id. at 725-26 [Emphasis added,
footnotes omitted]. See also, Arnold and Goldstein, Life under Lear, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 1235, 1256-59 (1970).
47. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.48 These broad opinions raised the issue of
whether protection of industrial secrets was limited to the protec-
tion afforded by the patent law.49  Both cases involved peti-
tions for injunctive relief sought on the basis of both the federal pat-
ent law and the Illinois law of unfair competition which prohibits
the copying of articles whether or not they are protected by patent
or copyright. The plaintiffs argued that the unfair competition law
prohibits the duplication of another's product not only to prevent
public confusion as to the source of a marketed article but also to
protect the trade value obtained by marketing an original production.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
in unreported opinions, had held the patents in question invalid,
but granted relief on a theory of unfair competition, reasoning that
the public would be misled as to the source of the Sears product be-
cause of the similarity to the Stiffel product.5"
48. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
49. The opinions in these cases created much discussion in the professional
literature, with commentators praising and condemning the possible effects of the
cases on nullifying the state law of trade secrets. For approval of the trend to-
ward pre-emption, see, Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-Emption-The
Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SoCY. 713 (1967): "It is one
thing to say that an inventor has an absolute right to keep his invention to him-
self; it is quite another to argue that an inventor has an absolute right to lawfully
disclose his invention to third parties, such as employees or licensees, use his in-
vention commercially, and then assert that he has an absolute right to the protec-
tion of the confidentiality of the relationship he has necessarily created in order
to commercially exploit his invention. . . . On the basis of the decisions of the
Supreme Court, it would appear that the federal patent laws fully occupy the
field of inventions in commercial use in the absence of a pending patent appli-
cation covering such inventions." Id. at 731-33.
For a view opposing pre-emption of trade secret law, see Doerfer, The Limits
on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80
HARV. L. REV., 1432 (1967): "As a result of the Sears case certain'limits upon the
law of trade secrets may be imposed. To a large degree the same limits could
be imposed by proper consideration of the balancing necessary between trade se-
cret and economic policies. The danger lies in the possible nullification of much
in trade secret law which may promote competition through a superficial analysis
of what is required by federal patent policy." Id. at 1462.
See generally, Kestenbaum, The Sears and Compco Cases: A Federal Right to
Compete by Copying, 51 A.B.A.J. 935 (1965); Treece, Patent Policy and Preemp-
tion: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1964); Note, The
Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 956 (1968);
Note, To What Extent Has Federal Patent and Copyright Law Preempted State Pro-
tection of Trade Values?-The Sears and Compco Cases, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 83
(1964).
50. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
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On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court considered only
the question of whether a state could, consistently with the Patent
Act, award damages or enjoin the copying of an unpatented arti-
cle." Holding that state courts could not grant relief for copying an
unpatented article on a theory of restraining unfair competition, the
Court reasoned in Stiffel that:
[Tlhe patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully used
to promote invention while at the same time preserving free competition. Obviously,
a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an article
which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents. To do either
would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true inven-
tions, and then only for a limited time. Just as a State cannot encroach upon the
federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding
unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws. 52
In its opinion in Compco, the companion case, the Court was even
more explicit in its holding of pre-emption and in its suggestion that
the reasoning it employed was not limited to cases involving charges
of unfair competition.
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not for-
bid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere with the fed-
eral policy, found in Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent laws
leave in the public domain. 53
Stiffel and Compco were both cases involving patent validity and
unfair competition, and did not directly involve trade secret law.
While the reasoning and language of these opinions was of suf-
ficient breadth to include pre-emption of trade secret law, some
51. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
52. Id. at 230-31. The Court infers that Congress meant to fully occupy the
area of patent protection by its grant of exclusive jurisdiction in suits arising under
the patent laws to federal courts. "The purpose of Congress to have national
uniformity in patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as
that which vest exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in federal
courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and that section of the Copyright Act which expressly
saves state protection of unpublished writings but does not include published
writings, 17 U.S.C. § 2." Id. at 231, n.7.
53. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The Court did suggest that alternative means were
available to the state to achieve the valid purpose of unfair competition laws in
protecting the public from being misled as to the source of manufactured products.
"While the federal patent laws prevent a State from prohibiting the copying
and selling of unpatented articles, they do not stand in the way of state law, stat-
utory or decisional which required those who make and sell copies to take pre-
cautions to identify their products as their own." Id. at 238.
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commentators urged a narrow reading of the case in order to
maintain the viability of state trade secret jurisdiction. For instance,
one law review commentator concluded: "In the area of trade secret
law, it is suggested that the various questions raised by Stiffel can
and should be resolved in favor of continued trade secret protection,
provided, however, that the remedy employed be adjusted where nec-
essary. ""'  Subsequent federal court decisions have cast doubt on the
viability of the above suggestion.
In Lear v. Adkins,-' the United States Supreme Court was called
upon to determine the validity of the doctrine of estoppel in suits
challenging the validity of patents. Suit had been initiated by Ad-
kins, a former employee, for royalties after termination of a licensing
agreement and before the grant of a patent. After termination of
the agreement, Adkins received his patent and then initiated suit for
the payment of back royalties; at trial, Lear asserted the defense of
invalidity of the patent. A California trial court held that Lear
was estopped from challenging the validity of a licensor's patent in
a suit for enforcement of the license agreement.56 The California
District Court of Appeals held that Lear was not obligated to pay
royalties after the repudiation of the agreement.57 The California
Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court decision,
holding that the doctrine of licensee estoppel precluded Lear from
the assertion of the defense of patent invalidity. 8 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of licensee estop-
pel and remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for fur-
ther proceedings to determine patent validity. 9  In remanding the
case to the state court, the Supreme Court went further than
merely voiding the licensee estoppel doctrine. The Court raised
the question of alternative theories available for recovery of pre-pat-
54. Comment, The Stillel-Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L.
REV. 956, 974 (1968) [Emphasis added].
55. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
56. Authority for this position was thought to be generally provided by the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950).
57. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd 67
Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967), rev'd 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
58. 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
59. 395 U.S. 653, 676 (1969).
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ent royalties and left it to the state courts to fashion a theory, if pos-
sible, which would not conflict with the patent law.
Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to reconsider the theoreti-
cal basis of their decisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors and it is
impossible to predict the extent to which this re-evaluation may revolutionize the
law of any particular State in this regard. Consequently, we have concluded,
after much consideration, that even though an important question of federal law
underlies this phase of the controversy, we should not now attempt to define in
even a limited way the extent, if any, to which the States may properly act to en-
force the contractual rights of inventors of unpatented secret ideas . . . . Indeed,
on remand, the California courts may well recognize the competing demands of pat-
ent law in a way which would not warrant further review in this court. 6 0
The opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan, then sug-
gests the possible conflict between patent law and state remedies and
relief. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Douglas, agreed that there was a conflict between the
patent law and state protection of unpatented inventions. Concur-
ring in the nullification of the licensee estoppel doctrine, the three
justices dissented from the majority's view that the potential con-
flict might be avoided by the state's careful selection of a legal
basis for providing relief.
[N]o state has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be
a new invention, except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office
under the exacting standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery
may, of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under which
self-styled "inventors" do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them,
in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws,
which tightly regulate the kind of inventions that may be protected and the man-
ner in which they may be protected. The national policy expressed in the patent
laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frus-
trated by private agreements among individuals with or without the approval of
the State.61
The question which remains unanswered is whether state courts can
fashion trade secret relief to protect unpatented inventions without
coming into conflict with the Patent Act which the United States
Supreme Court has held to be preeminent.
The question of the viability of trade secrets has been raised in
post-Lear litigation in only one circuit, with an affirmative response
coming from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
60. Id. at 675.
61. Id. at 677. (Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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cuit in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc."2 Painton brought an action
for a declaratory judgment on the validity of an agreement whereby
it would pay royalties on electric components it manufactured in
accordance with models, supplied by the defendant, which had not
been patented and on which no patent application was pending. The
district court, in declaring that enforcement of the license agreement
would be contrary to federal patent law, stated that:
Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be undercut if inventors
could enforce agreements for compensation for alleged secret ideas without being
required to submit these ideas to the Patent Office, and, thereby, eventually have
the ideas disclosed to the public. 63
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which reversed and remanded, holding that the main-
tenance of the integrity of the federal patent law was not a sufficient
basis for refusing to enforce the royalty provisions of trade secret
agreements, at least with respect to cases where no patent applica-
tion has been filed. 64
62. Painton & Company v. Boums, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
rev'd 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). Pre-Lear decisions in the various circuits were
in accord that an injunction based on state trade secret law would lie in diversity
cases to prevent a former employee from using information gained in confidence for
a limited period of time. See Servo Corporation of America v. General Electric
Co., 337 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1964), where the court observed: "Courts long
have recognized that where the holder of a trade secret imparts it to another in
confidence and that other person then appropriates it for his own use, equitable
remedies may be invoked to right the wrong. That it is not necessary that the
trade secret be covered by patent was made by (earlier cases]." Id. at 732.
The court distinguished Stijiel, supra note 47, on the grounds that unlike that case,
the instant case involved the breach of a confidential relationship. See also, Win-
ston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1965); and Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1966).
63. 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The district court discussed the
frustration of the patent laws which would occur by affording state trade secret
law protection to unpatented inventions: "Patent policy . . . which allows com-
pensation only for ideas which rise to the level of invention would be further un-
dermined by the enforcement of such a contract, since compensation would be
awarded for non-inventions. And if this court were to hold that before a state
could enforce a trade secrets contract, the ideas must be found to be an invention
as prescribed by the rigid requirements of federal patent law, inventors would be
able to circumvent 'the manner in which [inventions] may be protected.' In-
ventors would be encouraged to avoid filing applications altogether and contract for
long licensing arrangements. The severely restricted area which the Supreme Court
left open to applicable state law would become a yawning abyss. Fewer patent
applications would be made. The Patent Office would soon have a less accurate
view of the state of the art in a particular field. And state courts, rather than
the Patent Office, would become the initial triers of whether a discovery is an in-
vention." See Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y 1969).
64. 442 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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The court of appeals distinguished Stiffel and Compco reading those
cases to be limited to a finding of inconsistency between federal patent
law and those state laws which prohibit the manufacture of articles not
protected by valid patents or copyrights.65 The court reasoned that
there is a significant difference in saying, on the one hand, that a state
cannot enjoin the copying of an unpatented article, and saying,
on the other, that individuals cannot enter into contracts which limit
the use of revealable data by a contracting party but which do not pre-
clude others from independently discovering, developing, or copy-
ing an article or process. 6  The court read the Lear opinion nar-
rowly and limited it simply to the rejection of the licensee estoppel
doctrine, and saw no inconsistency with the patent law and the
maintenance of trade secret law.
We therefore do not find, either in general considerations of public policy or in
emanations from the federal patent law, a sufficient basis for declining to enf.rce
even the royalty provisions of trade secret agreements at least with respect to cases
where no patent application has been filed.67
The basic premise of the court of appeals was that the federal
patent law has not pre-empted the field of invention protection and
that state trade secret law serves as a useful encouragement to in-
vention.
Whatever the impact of Lear may be with respect to agreements governing inven-
tions for which patent applications have been filed, we find no suggestion in the
opinion that the Court intended to cast doubt on the longstanding principle that
an inventor who chooses to exploit his invention by private arrangements is entirely
free to do so, though in so doing he may forfeit his right to a patent.6 8
The basis on which the court of appeals concluded that states may
validly stimulate innovation, along with the federal government and
the federal patent law, remains uncertain. In fact, the language of
the United States Constitution article I, § 8, cl. 8, and the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Stiffel, Compco, and Lear indi-
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id. at 224-25. The court of appeals dismissed the concerns of the trial
court, supra note 63, reasoning that there would be no significant decline in pat-
ent applications because of the likelihood of obtaining a greater royalty payment
for a patented article or process, and because of the greater protection afforded by
a patent. Trade secret protection of unpatented articles was viewed as desirable
in limiting patent applications and encouraging invention.
68. Id. at 225. The forfeiture to which the court has reference is that re-
quired by 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (as amended, 1970) which provides that an owner
of an invention loses his right to apply for and obtain a patent if he markets his
invention for more than a year prior to application.
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cate that by the enactment of the federal patent law, Congress meant
to fully occupy the field of invention stimulation and protection.
The effect on trade secret law of the dicta in Lear, that "no
state has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is
claimed to be a new invention," remains uncertain. Although the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York read
Lear to prevent the enforcement of state trade secret law, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals ignored this language in the Lear
opinion. The viability of state trade secret law will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be an issue until language in the Lear opinion is clarified
and the question of the compatibility of state trade secret law and
federal patent law is more fully considered by the United States Su-
preme Court.
IV. CESSANTE RATIONE, ALIA INVENIATUR6 0
Some commentators, observing the difficulty of the owners of tech-
nological inventions in obtaining protection for their innovations re-
sulting from the unavailability of patent protection "due to the ris-
ing standard of patentability imposed by the court"7 and the
"threat of federal pre-emption of state trade secret law,"'" have
urged the enactment of a federal trade secret law to provide the
desired protection.
Clear, uniform trade secret protection is urgently needed, and it can be achieved
only when the continuing uncertainty of the pre-emption problem is laid to rest. The
most appropriate resolution would be enactment of federal legislation to settle both
the pre-emption problem and the need of protection.7 2
69. See A. CASNER AND W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 97, n.6
(1964).
70. Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1971).
71. Id. at 379-81.
72. Id. at 381. This statutory protection is said to be required to protect the
investment in research and development which is central to modem commercial
production and to facilitate international licensing of know-how. "The technologi-
cal developments that spurred industrial recovery after the second World War
have given rise to enormous investments for research and development in a con-
tinuing search for better products to satisfy expanding world markets. These in-
vestments in technological progress, coupled with ever rapid obsolescence, have
led to an increased reliance on trade secrets and know-how licensing on a na-
tional and international scale, and a corresponding rise in industrial espionage. The
present patchwork of confused common law doctrines and state criminal statutes
is inadequate to protect the first and prevent the second.
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While the need for protection may be valid and the benefit of fed-
eral legislation might be great, state courts continue to be petitioned
for protection of industrial secrets. At the same time, the opinion
in Lear itself leaves open the possibility of state courts fashioning
a basis for relief to protect the contractual rights of the owners of
technological secrets.
[W]e should not now attempt to define in even a limited way the extent, if any, to
which the States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of
unpatented secret ideas. Given the difficulty and importance of the task, it should
be undertaken only after the state courts have, after fully focused inquiry, deter-
mined the extent to which they will respect the contractual rights of such inventors
in the future. 73
The state law of trade secrets rests on the existence of an indus-
trial or innovative secret and on the existence of a contractual or
confidential relationship through which the secret information is re-
vealed. The identification of information worthy of protection is
difficult and frequently results in conflict with the federal patent
law which has fully occupied the area of stimulation and protection of
innovation. The second requirement of trade secret law provides an
independent basis for state vindication of private interests. If ade-
quate protection can be afforded to individuals through the use of con-
tractual arrangements containing specific terms directed toward
the protection of a confidential relationship, state courts may be able
to avoid both the difficult task of determining whether an article
or process constitutes a trade secret and the likelihood of conflict
with federal patent law.
The employment contract provides a particularly attractive area
for providing employers the type of protection sought under trade
secret laws. Covenants not to compete which are ancillary to em-
ployment contracts have long been viewed as enforceable so long as
"Sears and Lear demonstrate that the unresolved conflict in trade secret doctrine,
as well as the external problems of accomodation with the patent scheme and na-
tional goals of free competition, cannot be easily settled, by the courts. ...
[O]nly federal statutes can ensure the uniformity and deterrence needed in the
law of trade secrets. This problem area seems a fitting subject for Congressional
hearing and legislation." Id. at 401. See also, Comment, The "Copying-Misappro-
priation" Distinction: A False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-
emption Doctrine, 71 COL. L. REV. 1444, 1473 (1971) where the authors conclude
that: "[LLegislation specifically addressed to the problem of pre-emption may
prove helpful in alleviating some of the difficulties that have been discussed."
73. 365 U.S. 653, 675 (1969).
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they conform to standards of reasonableness. The landmark case,
decided in the early eighteenth century, was Mitchell v. Reynolds,74
which established the principle that restraints limited in geographi-
cal area of time would be judged according to their reasonable-
ness. In Mitchell, the Court upheld an agreement in a lease binding
the assignor of the lease not to exercise the trade of baker in a certain
parish for five years, or if he did, to pay plaintiff fifty pounds.
Courts in the United States have given closer scrutiny to covenants
ancillary to employment contracts than to those accompanying a sale
or lease of a business; yet, if the terms of the ancillary agreement
conform to the standards of reasonableness they will be enforced. 5
In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,70 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals summarized the pre-existing case law and adopted
the common law standard of reasonableness.
We do not see how a better test can be applied to the question whether this is or
[is] not a reasonable restraint of trade than by considering whether the restraint
is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor
of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the
public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party re-
quires can be of no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive. It is, in the eye of
the law, unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void on
the ground of public policy.7 7
To the extent that an employer has a competitive advantage, resulting
from the ownership of an innovation, and desires to protect that
advantage, a term in the employment contract restricting an em-
ployee's ability to compete for a reasonable time after ceasing his em-
ployment relationship would be enforceable. 78  This contractual
approach provides protection and focuses the attention of the court in
any enforcement action on the truly significant issue: balancing the
reasonable protection for an employer's competitive advantage
against the maintenance of free competition in the market place.
The chief problem which is created by the use of covenants not to
compete rather than trade secret law is the requirement that a per-
74. Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Williams 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Court of
King's Bench, 1711).
75. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625
(1960).
76. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
77. 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
78. See generally Fidler and Adair, supra note 3, at 108-14 (1971).
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iod of time be set which is reasonable as a restraint of trade and
not necessarily a period of time which would be required to in-
dependently derive the secret. The inability to reconcile these
time periods, however, is attributable to the underlying differences in
theory. Nevertheless, the choice of one theory over the other may be
dictated by the inability to maintain trade secret law in the face of
federal patent law.
Both patent and antitrust law represent national economic legisla-
tion; both are somewhat jeopardized by state enforcement of trade
secret law. Trade secret law creates a secondary basis for obtain-
ing invention monopoly, despite the fact that the patent law has
been enacted as the sole basis for obtaining such a limited mo-
nopoly. Trade secret law provides protection of a monopoly po-
sition and a competitive advantage to the former employer untested
by the standards required to determine whether a restraint of trade
is permitted. A covenant not to compete for a reasonable time avoids
the conflict with the patent law since there is no need to find the ex-
istence of a secret or innovation. Moreover, a covenant not to
compete ancillary to an employment contract can be scrutinized
under the antitrust laws, unlike trade secret protection where the
reasonableness of a particular restraint of trade is not examined.
The duration of trade secret protection, which conflicts with the main-
tenance of free competition, produces a restraint unchecked by the
standards of antitrust law.79 Trade secret protection is granted for
a period limited by the difficulty of reproducing the innovation;
if the information cannot be independently deduced, the former em-
ployee may never be able to compete with his former employer. Such
a restriction surely exceeds the standard of reasonableness imposed
by the antitrust laws on any restraint of trade.
Likewise, the problem, which arose in Lear and Painton, of li-
censing the use of trade secrets for the payment of royalties could be
avoided by arranging a single transaction where a specified amount
would be paid for the disclosure of information. The common law
79. The Restatement of Torts recognizes that trade secret law operates as an
imperfection in what otherwise is a system of free competition: "The privilege to
compete with others includes a privilege to adapt their business methods, ideas or
processes of manufacture. Were it otherwise, the first person in the field with a
new process or idea would have a monopoly which would tend to prevent competi-
tion." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757 comment a (1962).
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has always given the inventor the right to make, use, and sell his
invention.80  It is a legal truism that payment for consideration
consisting of an agreement to reveal an industrial idea, process or
model constitutes an enforceable contract.81 Such a contract will
be enforced whether or not the revelation constituting the considera-
tion is or is not a trade secret.
Again, there will be a difficulty in setting a price for a single trans-
action which will be the equivalent of the return available from a
series of royalty payments. The purchasers may not have sufficient
funds to pay a price which the owner of the innovation demands,
or may be unwilling to pay a given price until he determines
the usefulness or the demand for the innovation or secret. However,
it is the enforcement of license agreements which gives rise to
the judicial examination of the underlying subject matter; and if
the dicta in Lear is utilized as a standard for determining the com-
patibility of state law with patent law, a system of royalty pay-
ments for the licensing of the use of a trade secret is unlikely to be
upheld.82
80. See, e.g., Rawlings v. National Molasses Co., 394 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1968).
81. See generally CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 127, (1952): "If there are
willing buyers and sellers, there is a market; and it is their willingness that deter-
mines value. When two parties agree upon an exchange of this for that, they con-
stitute a part of the market. We have a free market, under our common law, for
the reason that the courts have left it free. They do not require that one person
shall pay as much as others may be willing to pay, or that one person shall receive
for what he sells as little as others may be willing to receive for a like article.
The contracting parties make their own contracts, agree upon their own exchanges,
and fix their own values. Inadequacy of consideration may be so gross as to
be evidence of fraud, mistake or undue influence; but in the absence of these it will
seldom effect the enforceability of a promise." Id. at 185.
82. There has been manifested a growing hostility toward exclusive licensing
agreements including those which involve a validly patented subject. See WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY (July 5, 1968 released May
21, 1969) [Reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT, No. 411,
Special Supplement, May 27, 1969] where the following proposal is made: "We
recommend that, in general, a patent owner who has granted a license with respect
to his patent must license all qualified applicants onj equivalent terms. This
proposal does not involve compulsory patent licensing. A patentee may decline
to issue any license at all, or he may issue licenses in some fields of use and re-
serve to himself the practice of the patent in other fields ...
"[T]o the extent this proposal increases the number of licensees during the life
of a patent, it may also result in more effective competition in the practice of the
patent after expiration." Id. at 10-11. See also Comment, The Patent-Antitrust
Balance: Proposals for Change, 17 VILL. L. REV. 463 (1972) suggesting the use
of a "rule of reason" in evaluating the validity of patent licenses based on the
[Vol. XXII: 196
1972] TRADE REGULATION LAW 221
It is clear that Lear struck down the licensee estoppel doctrine
and that now the licensee is able to contest the validity of the patent,
and perhaps the patentability, of the subject matter of his contract.83
Moreover, logic suggests that the concurring opinion is correct in its
suggestion that know-how licensing itself is unenforceable unless
based on a valid patent; otherwise, the decision in Lear would per-
mit the licensee to escape payment of royalties if the licensor had de-
scribed his ideas as patented or patentable but not if the licensor
had merely held out the subject matter to be a trade secret inven-
tion which was not patentable." ' However, a single contractual
transaction avoids the opportunity or need for a court to inquire
into the existence of a secret or innovation which merits protection.
The owner of an innovation may be limited in what he can bar-
gain for when limited to a single contractual transaction; but, then,
this limitation may be the consequence of having only an unpatent-
able innovation or secret to offer for sale.
As the Lear court suggested, it may be true that "states may
properly act to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpat-
author's suggestion of the unique "property" interest in the patent grant whose
value may be realized only through licensing its use.
83. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969): "[A]lthough li-
censee estoppel may be consistent with the letter of contractual doctrine, we can-
not say that it is compelled by the spirit of contract law, which seeks to balance
the claims of promisor and promisee in accord with the requirements of good
faith.
"Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are bal-
anced against the important public interest in permitting full and free competi-
tion in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain. Li-
censees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to
challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the
public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists with-
out need or justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of con-
tract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public interest in the typi-
cal situation involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has been issued."
Moreover, the Court does not limit the licensee's right to refuse to pay royalties
to that time following the declaration of invalidity, but holds that the licensee cannot
be required to continue to pay royalties during the time he is challenging the valid-
ity of the patent in the courts since to hold otherwise would encourage the licensor
to engage in delaying tactics to postpone the final adjudication of the patent's va-
lidity." Id. at 673.
84. 395 U.S. 653, 677 (1969) (Black, J., Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., con-
curring and dissenting): "[P]rivate arrangements under which self-styled 'in-
ventors' do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them, in return
for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly
regulate the kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in which
. . .contracted."
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ented secret ideas" 5 without the necessity of conflict with federal
patent law. If this is a valid premise, it is more likely that these
rights can be vindicated by the use of accepted contractual theories
and single contractual transactions rather than in the maintenance of
trade secret protection.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court continues to grant trade secret protec-
tion upon a showing of (1) the existence of secret information, and
(2) a confidential relationship between the person possessing the se-
cret information and the person who would divulge or appropriate
his information. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have suggested that Congress, by the enactment of the federal pat-
ent law, may have pre-empted the field of innovation stimulation and
the protection of industrial secrets. However, these decisions have
raised a more basic question which remains unanswered-to
what extent is state trade secret law compatible with federal patent
law? To the extent that state trade secret law depends upon the
showing of an industrial secret or innovation and operates to pro-
tect the same, state trade secret law competes with the federal patent
law. To the extent that confidential and contractual obligations
are being protected, alternative schemes such as covenants not to com-
pete and single contractual transactions offer appropriate legal theo-
ries for state vindication of owners of innovations who enter into em-
ployment contracts or contracts for sale in order to see their unpat-
ented ideas given material form in industrial production. Thus,
while protection of industrial secrets may not be fully obtainable under
traditional trade secret law, a more limited protection of underlying
valid interests may be obtained from other tort and contract theories.
85. Id. at 675.
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